ASSIMETRIAS DO SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL E A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DAS DECISÕES DA ORGANIZAÇÃO MUNDIAL DO COMÉRCIO.

Abstract

The substantial increase in trade between countries that negotiate multilaterally did also increase the number of disputes related to commercial issues that are regulated by WTO agreements and such disputes are resolved by its dispute settlement body. The large number of disputes arise not only the inconsistency of trade rules, but also a slightly more stabilized environment that was fostered by the creation of the WTO. The system of dispute settlement provided a more stable, predictable and governed by rules previously accepted by the members environment. The system of dispute brought unquestionable innovations in solving trade disputes, however, although most of its decisions are complied with for an index of noncompliance that should be examined, because any breach in the commercial harvest is problematic and generates numerous developments. This research is based on the search for an understanding of the reasons for the failure of these decisions and if noncompliance is the result of the influence of market values or institutional weakness of the WTO. The research tries to seek an understanding of the barriers that hinder the implementation of the decision of the OSC when the dispute is between a country with a strong economy and a developing country. It is in the implementation phase of the decisions that the economic and political disparities between states are revealed as the greater or lesser importance of access to certain market seems to be crucial to the decision to comply with a WTO ruling. To identify asymmetries, the work focuses mainly on the analysis of the cotton case involving Brazil and the U.S. over agricultural subsidies used by the Americans and considered illegal by the decision issued by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.